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Abstract
We adopt an artificial counterfactual approach to assess the impact of lockdowns on
the short-run evolution of the number of cases and deaths in some US states. To do so,
we explore the different timing in which US states adopted lockdown policies, and divide
them among treated and control groups. For each treated state, we construct an artificial
counterfactual. On average, and in the very short-run, the counterfactual accumulated
number of cases would be two times larger if lockdown policies were not implemented.
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ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
13
48
4v
1 
 [s
tat
.A
P]
  2
8 S
ep
 20
20
1 Introduction
The evolution of the Covid-19 has been posing several challenges to policymakers. Decisions have
to be made in a timely fashion, without much undisputed evidence to support them. Being a new
disease, and despite the enormous research effort to understand it, estimates of the transmission,
recovery and death rates remain uncertain. Nevertheless, these are key pieces of information to
assess potential pressures on the health system capacity, as well as the need of a lockdown policy
and its intensity if implemented.
Not surprisingly, similar regions have implemented different strategies regarding lockdowns.
The leading example in the media is the looser social distancing policy in Sweden versus strict
policies in its Scandinavian peers. By informally comparing the evolution of the pandemics in
Sweden and Denmark (or Norway), many commentators argue that several Covid-19 cases and
deaths in Sweden would be avoided in the short-run were a strict lockdown in place.1
Aiming to provide a quantitative assessment on the short-run effects of lockdowns, this paper
takes this exercise seriously in the context of US states. Given that the timing US states adopted
lockdown policies differs among them, we adopt techniques based on synthetic control (SC)
approach of Abadie and Gardeazabal [2003] and Abadie et al. [2010] to assess the impact of
lockdowns on the short-run evolution of the number of cases and deaths in the treated US
states.2 More specifically, we consider an extension of the original SC method called Artificial
Counterfactual (ArCo) which was put forward by Carvalho et al. [2018]. Due to the nonstationary
nature of the data, the correction of Masini and Medeiros [2019] is necessary.
Our results point to a substantial short-run taming of the cumulative number cases due to the
adoption of lockdown policies. On average, for treated states, the counterfactual accumulated
number of cases, according to the method adopted here, would be two times larger were lockdown
policies not implemented.
A key feature of our approach is that it is purely data-driven. In the beginning of the crisis,
the majority of papers written by economists to evaluate the effectiveness of lockdowns relied on
epidemiological models for analysis, including the most recent ones that incorporate behavioral
responses.3 These models are hard to discipline quantitatively. Many calibrated parameters
1Juranek and Zoutman [2020] explore this case study to construct proper counterfactuals. Hospitalizations
and ICU patients would be much higher in Denmark and Norway were Sweden’s more lenient measures adopted.
A.L. Andersen et al. [2020] argue that despite the divergence in deaths in Sweden relative to Denmark, at least in
the very short-run, there was not a large difference in the aggregate spending drop due to the stricter lockdown
strategy in Denmark.
2Throughout the main text in that paper, we focus on the number of cases. Results concerning the number
of deaths are relegated to the Appendix. The timing of most lockdowns was soon enough such that there is
not enough in-sample observations of deaths to apply the synthetic control method, so we use an alternative
methodology we explain below.
3Descriptions of epidemiological models and simulations concerning the evolution of the Covid-19 pandemic
can be found in Atkeson [2020b] and Berger et al. [2020]. Alvarez et al. [2020], Bethune and Korinek [2020], Jones
et al. [2020], Eichenbaum et al. [2020], among many others, incorporate behavioral responses and evaluate several
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remain uncertain,4 and models that incorporate behavioral responses need time to mature and
agree on a reliable set of ingredients and moments to be matched.
Model-free approaches like ours or Medeiros et al. [2020] should complement policy discussions
or forecasting exercises based on those models, especially from a quantitative point of view. There
are related papers using state or county level US data.5 At least one of them, Friedson et al.
[2020], uses a synthetic control approach but it is restricted solely to California. Other papers,
such as Brzezinski et al. [2020], Dave et al. [2020] and Sears et al. [2020], use variations in
the timing of statewide adoption of containment policies, and difference-in-differences models
to document substantial reductions in mobility and improvements of health outcomes. The
key identification assumption in these papers is that variations in the timing are random after
controlling for covariates. Brzezinski et al. [2020] also consider an instrumental-variable approach.
Fowler et al. [2020] and Grassi and J. Sauvagnat [2020] follow similar empirical strategies but at
county level, and also find substantial reductions in cases and fatalities in counties that adopted
stay-at-home orders and state-mandated business closures, respectively. Our analysis, that rests
on alternative identification assumption and method, should be seen as complementary. As the
pandemic evolves, and more data become available, we expect more related empirical evidence
to be consolidated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, while Section 3 presents the
empirical strategy. The results are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
Additional results are included in the Appendix.
2 Data
Data on Covid-19 (confirmed) cases are obtained from the repository at the Johns Hopkins
University Center for Systems Science and Engineering (JHU CSSE). We consider the cumulative
cases for a subset of the 50 US states and the District of Columbia. Instead of using the
chronological time across the states, we consider the epidemiological time, which means that the
day one in a given state is the day that the first Covid-19 case was confirmed there.
The econometric approach adopted here relies on the fact that some states adopted a lockdown
strategy (the treatment), whereas others did not adopt social distancing measures (control group)
and are used to construct the counterfactual.6 Lockdown strategies include a mix of state-wide
non-pharmaceutical measures aiming to limit social interactions, such as restrictions on non-
essential activities and requirements that residents stay at home.
containment policies.
4See, for example, Atkeson [2020a] on the uncertainty regarding estimates of the fatality rate.
5There are also related papers for other countries. For example, Fang et al. [2020] for China.
6The timing of those policies at each state were obtained, and double checked, in sev-
eral press articles, e.g., https://www.businessinsider.com/us-map-stay-at-home-orders-lockdowns-2020-3 and
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-home-order.html.
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3 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we describe how we assign states to control and treatment groups, and then,
describe the method used to construct the counterfactuals.
3.1 Treated and Non-treated States
Aiming to balance control and treatment states, and at the same time obtain enough observations
to estimate properly the model before the lockdown policy was implemented, we divide US states
into three groups.
For a state to be included in the analysis, a state-wide lockdown policy must be established at
least twenty days after the first case. We assume that whenever an individual becomes infected,
it takes an average of ten days to show up as a confirmed case in the statistics.7 Hence, the
in-sample period used to estimate the synthetic control (“before” the lockdown policy) for each
treated state (to be defined below) is the number of days between the tenth day after the first
confirmed case and the tenth day after the lockdown strategy was implemented. We choose to
start the in-sample from the tenth day as a way to smooth the initial volatility of the data.
We adopt a criteria that a state must have at least twenty observations in the in-sample
period to be included in the analysis. This criteria excludes states that adopted a state-wide
lockdown strategy too early, such as Connecticut, New Jersey, Ohio, among others. These are
the unmarked states in Table 1, which reports the dates of the first case and lockdown policy, as
well the difference in days between them, and also helps visualize the three groups of states.
The remaining states must be divided into treated and control groups. The idea is to find a
synthetic control for each of the treated states. The group of potential controls should consist of
states that adopted a lockdown policy too late (or never adopted), such that counterfactuals are
not contaminated by lockdown policies implemented in those states. At the same time, and for
a similar reasoning, the lockdown strategies adopted in treated states must be in place during
the period of analysis.8
7This assumption is motivated by the incubation period of the virus. According to the World Health
Organization, the “[...] the incubation period for COVID-19, which is the time between exposure to the
virus (becoming infected) and symptom onset, is on average 5-6 days, however can be up to 14 days.” See
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200402-sitrep-73-covid-19.pdf.
8In the Appendix A.1, Table A.1 shows the reopen dates for the treated states.
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Table 1: Number of Days from First Case until Lockdown for each State
State First Case Lockdown (𝑇0 + 10) Days Diff. State First Case Lockdown (𝑇0 + 10) Days Diff.
Alabama 03/13/2020 04/14/2020 32 Mississippi 03/12/2020 04/13/2020 32
Alaska 03/13/2020 04/07/2020 25 Missouri 03/08/2020 04/16/2020 39
Arizona 01/26/2020 04/10/2020 75 Montana 03/13/2020 04/07/2020 25
Arkansas 03/13/2020 - - Nebraska 03/06/2020 - -
California 01/26/2020 03/29/2020 63 Nevada 03/05/2020 04/11/2020 37
Colorado 03/06/2020 04/05/2020 30 New Hampshire 03/02/2020 04/06/2020 35
Connecticut 03/10/2020 04/02/2020 23 New Jersey 03/05/2020 03/31/2020 26
Delaware 03/11/2020 04/03/2020 23 New Mexico 03/11/2020 04/03/2020 23
DC 03/16/2020 04/03/2020 18 New York 03/02/2020 04/01/2020 30
Florida 03/02/2020 04/11/2020 40 North Carolina 03/03/2020 04/09/2020 37
Georgia 03/03/2020 04/13/2020 41 North Dakota 03/12/2020 - -
Hawaii 03/07/2020 04/01/2020 25 Ohio 03/10/2020 04/02/2020 23
Idaho 03/13/2020 04/04/2020 22 Oregon 02/29/2020 04/02/2020 33
Illinois 01/24/2020 03/31/2020 67 Pennsylvania 03/06/2020 04/11/2020 36
Indiana 03/06/2020 04/02/2020 27 Rhode Island 03/01/2020 04/07/2020 37
Iowa 03/09/2020 - - South Carolina 03/07/2020 04/17/2020 41
Kansas 03/08/2020 04/09/2020 32 South Dakota 03/11/2020 - -
Kentucky 03/06/2020 04/05/2020 30 Tennessee 03/05/2020 04/10/2020 36
Louisiana 03/11/2020 04/02/2020 22 Texas 03/05/2020 04/12/2020 38
Maine 03/12/2020 04/12/2020 31 Vermont 03/08/2020 04/04/2020 27
Maryland 03/06/2020 04/09/2020 34 Virginia 03/08/2020 04/04/2020 27
Massachusetts 02/01/2020 04/02/2020 61 Washington 01/22/2020 04/02/2020 71
Michigan 03/11/2020 04/03/2020 23 West Virginia 03/18/2020 04/03/2020 16
Minnesota 03/06/2020 04/04/2020 29 Wisconsin 03/10/2020 04/04/2020 25
Fortunately, there are horizons that can balance both goals: enough states to build the
synthetic controls and a relative extensive period to construct the counterfactuals. In particular,
we restrict the analysis up to the 58th epidemiological day. This figure accommodates at least ten
control states to build the synthetic controls,9 at the same time it maximizes the out-of-sample
days to run the counterfactuals. In this sense, our analysis concerns the very short-run impact
of lockdowns, up to nearly three weeks.
The treated states are marked in blue in Table 1, and include twenty states: Alabama, Col-
orado, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Car-
olina, Tennessee, and Texas. The potential control states are marked in red, and include ten
states: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Dakota,
9That is, to be in the control group, whenever a lockdown policy was implemented in a given control state, it
was implemented at least 48th days after the first epidemiological day. Given the aforementioned assumption, its
effects on Covid-19 confirmed cases only show up in the statistics ten days later, on average.
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South Dakota, and Washington. Nonetheless, due to the lack of variation within the in-sample
period, we exclude four states from this control pool as we explain below.
Importantly, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming only implemented partial lockdowns (not re-
ported in the table). Therefore, they are hard to classify as either treated or control states. We
opt to exclude them from the analysis.
Figure 1 illustrates the empirical strategy, which is formalized in the next subsection. It plots
the evolution of (log) cumulative cases along the epidemiological time. The first vertical dashed
line represents the tenth day after the first confirmed case. The in-sample period is represented
in between the first and second vertical dashed lines, which mark the tenth day and the following
twenty days, respectively. Similarly, the out-of-sample period is in between the second and third
vertical dashed lines, which mark the 31th and 58th epidemiological day, respectively.
Blue lines represent the treated states, whereas the red ones the potential control states. The
turning points from blue full- to dashed-lines represent the days lockdowns were implemented
(plus ten days) in treated states. Note that New York is clearly an outlier among the treated
states, exhibiting a huge amount of cases (more on that below). We use the red lines to build
synthetic controls for each full blue-line up to the turning point, and then construct counterfac-
tuals by simulating the synthetic controls forward up to the 58th day. The idea is to compare
them with the blue dashed-lines that capture actual cases.
Figure 1: (Log) Cumulative cases for each State in treated and control groups.
As Figure 1 highlights, some states display lack of variation within the in-sample period.
Just to give an example, Washington had had only one confirmed case for the first 36 days since
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its first confirmed Covid-19 infection. Hence, we exclude it from the control group. For similar
reasons, we also exclude Arizona, Illinois, and Massachusetts from the control pool. The analysis
ended up relying on six control states.
3.2 ArCo Specifications
We propose a two-step approach using the artificial counterfactual (ArCo) method introduced by
Carvalho et al. [2018] with the correction of Masini and Medeiros [2019] to estimate the number
of cases for each US state. Let 𝑡 = 10, 11, . . . , 58 represents the number of days after the first
confirmed case of Covid-19 in a given state. Define 𝑦𝑡 as the natural logarithm of the number of
confirmed cases 𝑡 days after the first case of the disease in this specific treated state, and 𝑥𝑡 as a
vector containing the logarithm of the number of reported cases for 𝑝 control states also 𝑡 days
after the first case has been reported as well as a logarithmic trend: log(𝑡). The inclusion of the
trend is important to capture the shape of the curve.
The model is estimated as follows. We use the weighted least absolute and shrinkage operator
(WLASSO) as described in Masini and Medeiros [2019] to select the control states that will be
used to estimate our counterfactual. The goal of the LASSO is to balance the trade-off between
bias and variance and is an useful tool to select the relevant peers in an environment with very
few data points:
̂︀𝛽 = argmin
𝛽
[︃
1
𝐿− 10
𝐿∑︁
𝑡=10
(︀
𝑦𝑡 − 𝑥′𝑡𝛽
)︀2
+ 𝜆
𝑝∑︁
𝑗=1
𝑤𝑗|𝛽𝑗|
]︃
, (1)
where 𝑤𝑗 = |𝑥𝑗,𝐿|, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑝− 1, and 𝑤𝑝 = 1. 𝐿 is, for each state, the number of days from the
first reported case until the lockdown plus ten extra days, and 𝜆 > 0 is the penalty parameter
which is selected by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), in accordance with Medeiros and
Mendes [2016]. The weight correction in the LASSO is necessary in order to control for the
nonstationarity of the data; see Masini and Medeiros [2019] for a detailed discussion.
The counterfactual for 𝑡 = 𝐿+ 1, . . . , is computed as
̂︀𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥′𝑡̂︀𝛽. (2)
We also report 95% confidence intervals based on the resampling procedure proposed in Masini
and Medeiros [2019].
3.3 Constructing a counterfactual to deaths
We are interested in examining the effects of lockdown policies not only on the number of cases,
but also on the number of deaths. However, we cannot implement the strategy described above
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because there is not enough variation in deaths for the in-sample period. Some states, for
instance, implemented a state-wide lockdown policies before the first confirmed death.
Thus, we propose an alternative method. We consider a counterfactual state for the number of
deaths based on the counterfactual estimated for the number of cases. This is not straightforward
as in the traditional synthetic control method because the ArCo methodology described above
includes an intercept in the estimation, which is measured in the log of the number of cases,
and not only a convex combination of other states. Intuitively, the methodology described above
chooses a combination of states that is at a fixed distance from the treated unit at the in-sample
period and not a convex combination of states that matches exactly the actual number of cases.
The intercept controls for all time-invariant characteristics that define the counterfactual.
Then, we proceed as follows. Let 𝑦𝑠𝑡 be the number of accumulated deaths in state 𝑠 at the
day 𝑡. Also, let 𝛽𝑠 be the vector of estimated coefficients for the state 𝑠 as in (1) and used to
construct the counterfactual for cases. In addition, let 𝑦𝑡 be a vector of the number of deaths for
all states in the control pool at time 𝑡. We define the counterfactual number of deaths in that
state as:
𝑦𝐶𝑠𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡𝛽
𝑠 − 𝑦𝑡𝛽𝑠 + 𝑦𝑠𝑡 (3)
where 𝑡 is the day that state 𝑠 implemented the lockdown policies. That is, we maintain the
weights estimated above and adjust the intercept so that the counterfactual series for deaths
matches the number of actual observed deaths in the beginning of the quarantine. For the sake
of exposition, we relegate the results on cumulative deaths to Appendix A.4.10
4 Results
To illustrate how the method works, Figure 2 presents the ArCo counterfactuals for the states
of Alabama, Colorado, and Maine. The timing of the policy intervention (𝑇0 + 10) corresponds
to the lockdown date plus ten days.
The counterfactual analysis makes it clear the importance of lockdown policies in mitigating
the acceleration of the number of Covid-19 confirmed cases in the treated states. As shown in
Figure 2a, for example, our results point to a substantial increase in the number of cases in
Alabama if it had not adopted an early lockdown. Similarly, Figures 2b and 2c reveal the same
behavior for the cumulative curves in the other selected states. Counterfactuals are constructed
with the estimated weights and cumulative cases of the six states that compose the control group.
These weights are reported in Table A.2 in Appendix A.2. In Appendix A.3, we present similar
counterfactual plots for the remaining treated states.
10In a separate appendix, available upon request, we use a similar methodology to show that the counterfactual
generated by the ArCo is able to match baseline characteristics of treated states that were not used in the
estimation process.
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Figure 2: ArCo estimates counterfactual without state lockdown (𝑇0 + 10)
(a) Alabama
(b) Colorado
(c) Maine
In order to assure that the proposed methodology is producing proper counterfactual analysis,
we generate placebo results by producing a “synthetic control” for each control state using the
remaining control states as control pool. Results are displayed in Figure 3, which shows the ratio
of the estimated counterfactual cumulative cases to the actual ones for treated states except New
York (black lines), and non-treated states (red lines). We assume that the epidemiological day
of the placebo intervention is 𝑇0 = 36, marked by the vertical dashed line, which is the median
(and the mean) timing of the policy interventions in the treated states.
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Figure 3: Ratio between estimated and actual cumulative cases (𝑇 = {10, ..., 58})
It is reassuring that for half of the placebo counterfactuals the ratios fluctuate around one,
whereas for the majority of treated states ratios grew above one at some point (likely around
the actual timing of policy intervention). The latter result means that lockdown policies were
effective to tame the spread of the virus, whereas the former suggests that results are not driven
by chance.
Regarding South Dakota, the only placebo counterfactual that reached a ratio well above one,
by using Google Mobility Data (described in Appendix A.5), we show that mobility in residential
areas increased whereas mobility in outdoor areas decreased substantially once compared to the
period before the pandemic (see Figures A.41 and A.42 in Appendix A.5). This is suggestive
that South Dakota’s population endogenously decided to stay more at home, and avoided en-
vironments prone to the risk of contamination. At the time, a proper lockdown policy was not
necessary, and South Dakota’s non-conformity to the placebo test does not seem to invalidate
our approach.
In contrast, for Nebraska and California, the counterfactuals are pointing to a smaller number
of cases than the actual ones, which goes against finding that lockdowns were effective to reduce
cases of Covid-19. The case of California is quite emblematic, as the number of cases during the
estimation window remained very small and with very low variation. However, the number of
cases started to grow at a fast rate much after the cut-off date. The state of Nebraska displays
a similar pattern.
To gauge the quantitative impact of lockdown policies, for each state, whether treated or
control used as placebo, we compute the ratio of the counterfactual estimated comulative cases
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(“without” a lockdown strategy in place) to actual ones on the 58th epidemiological day, which
is the last day used to compute the counterfactual. Table 2 reports the mean and median of
the ratios across states, whereas Table A.3 in Appendix A.2 reports these ratios for each state.
The first row corresponds the case in which controls are used as placebos, whereas the second
considers the treated states only. As we discuss below, New York is clearly an outlier, whose ratio
reached an implausible value of 16.5 as reported in Table A.3. Hence, our preferred specification
is displayed in the third row which excludes New York from the pool of treated states. We also
compute other two versions of these ratios using the lower bound (lb) and upper bound (up) of
the 95% confidence interval in the numerator.
Table 2: ArCo estimates (58th day)
Mean ArCo Med ArCo Mean lb Med lb Mean ub Med ub
Control 1.04 0.92 0.91 0.80 1.18 1.03
Treated 3.08 2.28 2.46 1.91 3.67 2.63
Treated (-NY) 2.37 2.08 1.99 1.72 2.75 2.32
The ratios are clearly above one for the treated units, whether New York is excluded or not.
According to our preferred specification, counterfactual estimates suggest that the number of
cases would be nearly two times larger were lockdown policies absent. Again, it is reassuring
that among the controls used as placebo, these average ratios remain around one.
Regarding the effects of lockdowns on cumulative deaths, we present the results for all treated
states in Appendix A.4. For some states, the counterfactual cumulative deaths exhibit similar
patterns to those regarding cumulative cases. But, for many other states, they are not statistically
significant at least for the first days after the policy implementation. One possible explanation
is that there is a delay between cases and deaths, as the latter is a consequence of the former.
Hence, deaths only show up in the official statistics days after cases. Perhaps, if we could estimate
counterfactuals for longer periods, the synthetic accumulated deaths would further decouple from
the actual ones. In addition, since weights on the controls are estimated considering the (log)
cumulative number of cases, the counterfactuals for cumulative deaths are arguably noisier.11
4.1 Outlier: New York
As discussed above and presented in Table A.3 in Appendix A.2, we obtain an implausible ratio
(of counterfactuals to actual cumulative cases) of 16.5 to New York. This section puts a lens on
11In a separate appendix, available upon request, we run an extensive robustness analysis. In particular, we
implement two alternative approaches to identify the effects of lockdown policies on cumulative cases at the state
level. Namely, propensity score matching and traditional synthetic control approach. We find results that are
broadly consistent with those reported in this paper.
10
this state. In particular, Figure 4 displays the estimated cumulative number of cases for New
York “without” lockdown, as well as extrapolations of the cumulative number of cases based on
the mean and median growth rate of the last ten days of the in-sample period.
Figure 4: New York: ArCo Estimates Counterfactual Without State Lockdown (𝑇0 + 10)
As reported in Table 1, among the treated states, New York was the fastest one to react to
the pandemic, and established a state-wide lockdown policy only 20 days after the first case.
Figure 4 extrapolates the last in-sample observations by using both the observed mean and
median growth rates for the last ten days, which yields a similar pattern to the result obtained
by applying the synthetic control approach. Due to the progression of the virus, particularly in
New York City, the in-sample observed rates are quite high once compared to other states as
illustrated in Figure 1, which can be explained not only by the dynamics of the city but also by
its high population density. Hence, New York is clearly an outlier and might not be amenable
to our synthetic control approach, which justifies reporting results excluding New York above.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, as opposed to most of the early and incipient literature on the lockdown effects
during the Covid-19 crisis, we conisder a purely data-driven approach to assess the impact of
lockdowns on the short-run evolution of the number of cases and deaths in some US states. Also,
as opposed to some recent papers that use a difference-in-difference approach, we adopt a variant
of the synthetic control approach, ArCo, due to Carvalho et al. [2018] and Masini and Medeiros
[2019]. On average, according to the synthetic controls, the counterfactual accumulated number
of cases would be two times larger were lockdown policies not implemented in treated states.
11
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A Appendix
A.1 Reopen Dates
In the first two columns of Table A.1 we show the date of the first confirmed case in every treated
state we analyze and its reopen date (plus ten days), whenever available at the time we started
to circulate this paper.12 In the third column, we show the difference (in days) from the first
confirmed case and the reopen date plus ten days.
Table A.1: Number of Days from First Case until Reopen for each Treatment State
State First Case Reopen (+10) Days Diff.
Alabama 03/13/2020 05/10/2020 58
Colorado 03/06/2020 05/07/2020 62
Florida 03/02/2020 05/14/2020 73
Georgia 03/03/2020 05/10/2020 68
Kansas 03/08/2020 05/14/2020 67
Kentucky 03/06/2020 - -
Maine 03/12/2020 05/10/2020 59
Maryland 03/06/2020 06/11/2020 97
Mississippi 03/12/2020 05/17/2020 66
Missouri 03/08/2020 05/14/2020 67
Nevada 03/05/2020 05/19/2020 75
New Hampshire 03/02/2020 05/21/2020 80
New York 03/02/2020 05/25/2020 84
North Carolina 03/03/2020 05/18/2020 76
Oregon 02/29/2020 05/25/2020 86
Pennsylvania 03/06/2020 06/08/2020 94
Rhode Island 03/01/2020 05/18/2020 78
South Carolina 03/07/2020 05/14/2020 68
Tennessee 03/05/2020 05/07/2020 63
Texas 03/05/2020 05/10/2020 66
These figures illustrate why we had to limit our sample size to only 58 epidemiological days.
For example, if we had used 60 days in our analysis, we would have to exclude Alabama and
Maine from our treated states, given that they would not be in a state-wide lockdown in the last
days of the out- of-sample period.
12In other words, it represents the tenth day after the day the state-wide lockdown policy was supposed to end.
It is possible that these dates changed.
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A.2 Cumulative Cases: ArCo Statistics
We report in the first seven rows of Table A.2 the coefficients estimated by the LASSO model
for each treated state for the 𝑇0+10 in-sample period. The last two rows display the mean and
the median (across the out-of-sample period) of the ratio between the actual cumulative cases
and the counterfactual cases for every state.
Table A.2: LASSO Coefficients
LASSO Coefficients (𝑇0+10)
AL CO FL GA KS KY ME MD MS MO NV NH NY NC OR PA RI SC TN TX
(Intercept) 3.49 0.95 -1.93 -0.47 -0.31 -1.45 2.49 -0.30 3.38 -0.62 -0.31 -3.36 -2.00 -2.56 -1.10 -0.75 -7.31 0.66 -1.78 -0.32
Arkansas 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.48 0.00 0.00 0.00
California 0.00 0.00 -0.25 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.36 -0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 -0.20 0.00 0.00
Iowa 0.21 0.82 0.91 0.68 0.77 0.78 0.31 0.60 0.18 0.54 0.35 0.00 0.79 0.88 0.44 1.12 0.52 0.45 0.46 1.00
Nebraska 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.24 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.20 0.03 -0.16 0.38 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.22 0.00 0.21 -0.09 0.00
North Dakota 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.15 0.00 0.39 0.20 0.00 0.10 0.70 0.45 1.02 1.40 0.61 0.00 0.00 -0.73 0.26 1.23 0.14
South Dakota 0.29 0.27 0.00 0.20 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.40 0.00 -0.14 0.09
Log(𝑡) 0.43 0.00 0.24 0.32 0.23 0.07 0.21 0.28 0.41 0.88 0.42 0.00 - 0.13 0.00 0.29 0.08 0.53 0.33 0.19
Mean 𝑦/𝑦 (OSS) 0.81 0.57 0.63 0.76 0.73 0.68 0.82 0.71 0.97 1.12 1.12 0.51 0.33 0.48 0.57 0.46 0.76 0.89 0.39 0.54
Median 𝑦/𝑦 (OSS) 0.78 0.53 0.58 0.74 0.68 0.68 0.80 0.70 0.97 1.09 1.12 0.46 0.22 0.41 0.55 0.40 0.72 0.87 0.31 0.48
With only two exceptions (Missouri and Nevada), every state has an out-of-sample mean and
median of the observed-to-predicted ratio below one. This means that, on average, the realized
cumulative cases were smaller than the counterfactual, which highlight that lockdowns had a
meaningful impact on slowing down the Covid-19 spread in these states.
A.2.1 ArCo Forecasts for Every State
Table A.3 reports the ratio of the counterfactual cumulative cases to the actual ones on the 58th
day after the first confirmed case in each state. It also reports the lower and upper limits of
the 95% confidence interval. Among the 20 treated states, the ratio is larger than one in 18 of
them. For Missouri and Nevada, there is no evidence on the effectiveness of lockdown policies.
For Mississipi and South Carolina, the impacts of lockdowns are only modest. Note that New
York is clearly an outlier, with such ratio around 16.5. We discuss this case in the main text.
In contrast, among the non-treated states, we obtain ratios close to one for three out of six
cases. We assume that the cut-off of the placebo intervention is 𝑇0 = 36, which is the median
(and the mean) timing of the policy interventions in the treated states. As discussed in the
main text, South Dakota, which displays a ratio well above one, experienced a large reduction
in outside mobility even without official lockdown measures. California and Nebraska, which
display ratios below one, had very few Covid-19 confirmed cases during the period before the
cut-off.
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Table A.3: Counterfactual/actual cases ratio for every State (58th day)
State ArCo forecast ArCo lb ArCo ub Treated
Alabama 1.30 1.14 1.44 Yes
Colorado 2.78 2.34 3.25 Yes
Florida 2.48 2.11 2.94 Yes
Georgia 1.68 1.43 2.10 Yes
Kansas 1.49 1.34 1.69 Yes
Kentucky 2.68 2.31 2.99 Yes
Maine 1.45 1.33 1.59 Yes
Maryland 2.08 1.72 2.32 Yes
Mississippi 1.03 0.98 1.08 Yes
Missouri 0.74 0.61 0.86 Yes
Nevada 0.82 0.63 1.05 Yes
New Hampshire 2.90 2.15 3.55 Yes
New York 16.48 11.44 21.18 Yes
North Carolina 3.69 2.95 4.28 Yes
Oregon 3.96 3.21 4.33 Yes
Pennsylvania 5.63 4.99 6.41 Yes
Rhode Island 1.72 1.47 2.06 Yes
South Carolina 1.18 1.03 1.31 Yes
Tennessee 4.25 3.56 4.95 Yes
Texas 3.19 2.56 4.00 Yes
Arkansas 0.97 0.93 1.03 No
California 0.01 0.01 0.01 No
Iowa 0.93 0.81 1.02 No
Nebraska 0.28 0.23 0.32 No
North Dakota 0.92 0.78 1.09 No
South Dakota 3.13 2.72 3.59 No
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A.3 Cumulative Cases: ArCo Estimates for Treated states
In this section, in Figures A.1–A.20, we report the counterfactual estimates for all states that
adopted lockdown strategies. With the exception of Missouri, Mississippi, Nevada, and South
Carolina, lockdown measures were effective in reducing the number of confirmed cases in the
very short-run.
Figure A.1: ArCo Estimates for Alabama (Cumulative Cases)
Figure A.2: ArCo Estimates for Colorado (Cumulative Cases)
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Figure A.3: ArCo Estimates for Florida (Cumulative Cases)
Figure A.4: ArCo Estimates for Georgia (Cumulative Cases)
Figure A.5: ArCo Estimates for Kansas (Cumulative Cases)
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Figure A.6: ArCo Estimates for Kentucky (Cumulative Cases)
Figure A.7: ArCo Estimates for Maryland (Cumulative Cases)
Figure A.8: ArCo Estimates for Maine (Cumulative Cases)
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Figure A.9: ArCo Estimates for Missouri (Cumulative Cases)
Figure A.10: ArCo Estimates for Mississippi (Cumulative Cases)
Figure A.11: ArCo Estimates for North Carolina (Cumulative Cases)
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Figure A.12: ArCo Estimates for New Hampshire (Cumulative Cases)
Figure A.13: ArCo Estimates for Nevada (Cumulative Cases)
Figure A.14: ArCo Estimates for New York (Cumulative Cases)
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Figure A.15: ArCo Estimates for Oregon (Cumulative Cases)
Figure A.16: ArCo Estimates for Pennsylvania (Cumulative Cases)
Figure A.17: ArCo Estimates for Rhode Island (Cumulative Cases)
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Figure A.18: ArCo Estimates for South Carolina (Cumulative Cases)
Figure A.19: ArCo Estimates for Tennessee (Cumulative Cases)
Figure A.20: ArCo Estimates for Texas (Cumulative Cases)
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A.4 Cumulative Deaths: ArCo Estimates for Treated states
In this section, in Figures A.21–A.40, we report the counterfactual estimates for cumulative
deaths based on the methodology described in Section 3.3. As we discuss in the main text,
although for some states, the counterfactuals exhibit similar shapes to those regarding cumulative
cases, for many other states, they are not statistically significant at least for the first days after
the policy implementation.
Figure A.21: ArCo Estimates for Alabama (Cumulative Deaths)
Figure A.22: ArCo Estimates for Colorado (Cumulative Deaths)
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Figure A.23: ArCo Estimates for Florida (Cumulative Deaths)
Figure A.24: ArCo Estimates for Georgia (Cumulative Deaths)
Figure A.25: ArCo Estimates for Kansas (Cumulative Deaths)
25
Figure A.26: ArCo Estimates for Kentuky (Cumulative Deaths)
Figure A.27: ArCo Estimates for Maryland (Cumulative Deaths)
Figure A.28: ArCo Estimates for Maine (Cumulative Deaths)
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Figure A.29: ArCo Estimates for Missouri (Cumulative Deaths)
Figure A.30: ArCo Estimates for Mississipi (Cumulative Deaths)
Figure A.31: ArCo Estimates for North Carolina (Cumulative Deaths)
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Figure A.32: ArCo Estimates for New Hampshire (Cumulative Deaths)
Figure A.33: ArCo Estimates for Nevada (Cumulative Deaths)
Figure A.34: ArCo Estimates for New York (Cumulative Deaths)
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Figure A.35: ArCo Estimates for Oregon (Cumulative Deaths)
Figure A.36: ArCo Estimates for Pennsylvania (Cumulative Deaths)
Figure A.37: ArCo Estimates for Rhode Island (Cumulative Deaths)
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Figure A.38: ArCo Estimates for South Carolina (Cumulative Deaths)
Figure A.39: ArCo Estimates for Tennessee (Cumulative Deaths)
Figure A.40: ArCo Estimates for Texas (Cumulative Deaths)
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A.5 Google Mobility Data
We know that lockdowns affect the Covid-19 dynamics by imposing social distancing and mobility
restrictions. To help understand the results described in this paper, we analyze the mobility data
available at Google Mobility Reports (https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/).
Google mobility data show how visits and length of stay at different places change compared
to a baseline, before the outbreak of the pandemic. In particular, the baseline is the median
value, for the corresponding day of the week, during the five weeks between January 3rd and
February 6th 2020.
In order to understand how the population in each group (treated and control states) is
behaving during the Covid-19 crisis, we compute the median of mobility changes across our
sample period, i.e. the 48 days following the tenth day after the first confirmed case in each
state. Also, the data concern mobility changes for six categories, being five of them related to
outdoor activities. Namely, grocery & pharmacy, transit stations, parks, retail & recreation, and
workplaces. The remaining one concerns indoor activities, namely, residential.
Hence, to capture an idea of outdoor mobility changes, we aggregate the aforementioned five
categories into a single one defined as the median of the original five categories. In contrast,
mobility changes in residential areas capture indoor mobility changes. The two boxplots in
Figures A.41 and A.42 present the median of mobility changes in all analyzed states both in
residential and in outdoor areas, respectively. We report results for treated and control states
separately.
Figure A.41: Median of mobility changes in residential areas
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Figure A.42: Median of mobility changes in outdoor areas
Regarding mobility changes in residential areas, on average, residents from every state ana-
lyzed spent more time in these areas after the pandemic outbreak. However, those from treated
states spent even more time indoor. Nevertheless, there are outliers. For instance, residents from
South Dakota spent a lot more time in residential areas than before the pandemic, which helps
understand the results found for this state in the placebo test.
We found similar results for mobility changes in outdoor areas. Clearly, residents from treated
states remained in outside areas less often than residents from controls (always compared to the
period before the pandemic). In New York, for example, there was a 50% decrease of outdoor
mobility. Once more, South Dakota is an outlier for the control group, reinforcing the thesis that
its population voluntarily decided to stay more at home. Indeed, residents from South Dakota
spent almost 20% less time in outside areas, while those from the median state for the control
group spent nearly 8% less.
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